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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The case caption identifies all parties to this proceeding. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the Deputies fail to timely file their grievance with the Utah County Career 
Service Council within three months from the date of the occurrence as required by Utah 
County Office of Personnel Management Rule and Regulation section VILE. 1.? 
Statute of limitations questions are reviewed for correctness incorporating a clearly 
erroneous standard of review for the subsidiary factual determination of when the Plaintiffs 
should have known of their alleged legal injuries. Spears v. Reynolds, 2002 UT 24, f^ 32. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Section VILE. 1 of the Utah County Office of Personnel Management Rules and Regulations 
(PRR). (Any career service employee who has completed a . . . probationary period . . . 
having a grievance over merit principles may appeal to the Career Service Council. The 
employee must file a written notice with the personnel director within three months from the 
date of the occurrence . . .) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1991, Utah County Sheriffs Deputies Charles Martin and George Alexanderson 
held the position of Shift Supervisor in the Utah County Jail. (R 1477 12) Mr. Martin had 
worked with the Sheriffs Office since January of 1986 and was promoted to Shift 
1 
Supervisor in June of 1987. (R 1477 3, 12) Mr. Alexanderson started with the Sheriffs 
Department on February 8, 1988 and was promoted to Shift Supervisor in April of 1990. 
(R 1477 57) In 1991, Deputies Mark Binks, Bonnie Herkimer, Rod Robinson and John 
Gruenbaum were also Shift Supervisors in the jail. (R 1476 57, 58) John Carlson was the 
lieutenant over the jail, supervising three jail sergeants, Lana Morris (Johnson) and Dixie 
Jones (Brunson), (who supervised the Shift Supervisors) and Mike Pientka. (R 1476 52-54, 
Exhibit L, R 850-852) The Utah County Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
maintained job descriptions for Shift Supervisor and Jail Sergeant. (Ex 1A, IB, R 917, 915) 
The Jail Policies and Procedures Manual promulgated by the Sheriffs Department(JPPM) 
contained a duties explanation for Shift Supervisor and Jail Sergeant/On Line which 
corresponded with the 1991 organizational charts. (Exhibits 1A, IB, G, L, R833, 850-852) 
The JPPM regulates day to day kinds of activities in the jail. Jail Policies and Procedures 
were operational and applied to the jail only. (R 1477 129, 130). JPPM Section 150 
provided that promotion of jail staff members would be based on the demonstration of merit, 
specified qualifications and competitive examinations, and would be carried out rationally 
impartially and according to the law. Section 150.02 provided that all staff members 
desiring promotion in the jail would be subject to a written examination, oral interview, 
review of evaluations and length of service. Section 150.02.3 also provided that the length 
of time served will be a basis for eligibility for sergeant requiring three years of correctional 
experience including one year as a Shift Supervisor. The OPM job description minimum 
qualifications for Jail sergeant were four years of experience as a deputy sheriff or detective, 
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POST certification, qualifying score on the sergeant's examination. (Exhibit IB, R 914) 
In 1991, Utah County undertook a salary survey which was completed in July of that year. 
The salary survey revised job descriptions after input from employees. (R 1476 42) The 
salary survey consisted of all of the job descriptions that were developed. (R 1476 51) 
While various sergeant job descriptions were provided, the salary survey did not provide a 
job description for Shift Supervisor in the jail, which was eliminated. (Exhibit 4, R 910, 
Exhibit 5, R 909) Pre-salary survey employment in the jail was on a career track basis. Post-
salary survey employment in the jail was not. Because Shift Supervisors were intermediate 
positions, not department-wide sanctioned and confined to specific areas with specific 
needs, the position did not lend itself well to career opportunities and the Sheriff determined 
it would be better if first line supervisors were all of the rank of sergeant. (R 1477 109-111) 
The Sheriff, as a result, eliminated the position of Shift Supervisor, reclassifying Shift 
Supervisors to corrections specialists. Promotions to sergeant were then made subsequent 
to the reclassification under a competitive process. (R 1477 112) The Sergeant/Jail 
Operations post salary survey job description dated 12-23-91 was retroactive to July 22, 
1991 when the salary survey was implemented and required as minimum qualifications 
"Current POST Certification, Current CPR Certification, Requires BS degree and three 
years job related work experience." (R 911-912, Exhibit 1C) 
As a result of the reorganization in the Sheriffs Department after the salary survey, 
the separate career path that had been pursued in the jail was eliminated. Thereafter 
sergeants could be assigned anywhere within the Department at Sheriff Bateman's 
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discretion. (R 1477 124-126) In the 1991 sergeants' selection process, Mr. Alexanderson 
was considered for training, patrol, operations, civil and corrections sergeant's positions. 
Mr. Martin was considered for training and corrections sergeant's positions. (Exhibit O, R 
856-860, 1477 113) The selection process for sergeants' promotions in 1991 consisted of 
resume review and promotability assessments completed by all deputy sheriffs who were of 
the rank of sergeant or above for each of the candidates who were qualified. (R 1477 114, 
115) After the Shift Supervisor position was eliminated, Shift Supervisor experience was 
no longer required for promotion to sergeant in the jail. (R 1477 140) 
In December, 1991, Shift Supervisors Bonnie Herkimer and Mark Binks, and Patrol 
Deputy Dennis Howard, were promoted to Sergeant in the Jail. Sgt. Pientka continued as 
a Jail Sergeant. Shortly after the December 1991 promotions, Mr. Alexanderson transferred 
to Patrol and Mr. Martin transferred to Animal Control. (R 18, 20, 21, 35, 74) 
Mr. Martin did not believe Bonnie Herkimer was peace officer certified, and was not 
sure whether Mark Binks was peace officer certified when promoted in 1991. He did not 
believe Dennis Howard was Shift Supervisor for a year and did not have a college degree. 
(R 1477 30). On paper Shift Supervisors were reclassified back to Corrections Specialists 
or Deputy Sheriff III and then promoted after being reclassified. (R 1477 31). Mr. Martin 
learned that Herkimer and Binks had been promoted to Sergeant when he saw them wearing 
Sergeant stripes. (R 1477 32). Mr. Martin since 1992 applied for Sergeant positions four 
times, the most recent being 1996. (R 1477 36). In the last two years before 1997 Mr. 
Alexanderson did not participate in Sergeant's promotions as the Sergeant's promotions 
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were in all likelihood were going to remain the Jail the rest of their career. (R 1477, 77-78). 
Mr. Alexanderson alleged Mark Johnson was promoted to Sergeant in the Civil Division, 
in 1990 or 1991, when he saw his Sergeant stripes. Rex Murdock in Animal Control was 
promoted without any register or open test, Larry Patterson was promoted in October of 
1991 to Sergeant in Emergency Management, Tom Wroe the County Fire Marshall, and 
Kirby Packham were promoted to sergeant. Yvette Rice was promoted to sergeant in 1994 
without open competitive testing. (R 1477 85-91) Mike Swenson was paid at a Grade 20 
the same as Sergeants for supervising inmates on work projects. 
Mr. Alexanderson tested for a Sergeant's position in 1993, Mr. Martin did not apply. 
(R 1477 141, Exhibit 6). The Deputies were on the register for the December 1992 Jail 
Sergeant position. (Exhibit 16 R 874). In December 1994 most eligible deputies requested 
the Sheriff promote without testing. Mr. Alexanderson did not apply for this test because 
he did not agree with it, Mr. Martin did and signed the waiver. (Exhibit I, R 836-837, R 
1477 150-151). The Deputies participated in the 1995 Sheriffs promotional process. 
(Exhibit 17, R 1477 151-152). Mr. Martin participated in 1996 but Mr. Alexanderson did 
not. (R 900). The Deputies withdrew from the 1997 promotions. (R 1477 54, 889) On 
December 17., 1996 the Deputies met with Sheriff Bateman and raised the following issues 
with Sheriff Bateman in printed outline form. Shift Supervisors were promised sergeants 
positions and should have been placed in sergeants' positions before subordinates had the 
opportunity to test; Corporal's were promised upgrade to sergeant and were already doing 
sergeant work; Shift Supervisors were asked to vote on accepting the rank of Sergeant 
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without a related pay raise in a Shift Supervisor meeting; Mark Binks, Bonnie Herkimer, 
Mark Johnson, and Art Adcock were grandfathered into sergeant's rank which should have 
been the case until all Corporal's in good standing were upgraded; written Jail Policy 
150.02(3)(b) mandated one year Shift Supervisor experience as a requirement for eligibility 
for promotion to Sergeant; Corporal's were asked to stop wearing rank insignia thereby 
negating promotions without cause; Subordinate's of those Corporals were then promoted 
to ranking positions over the Corporal's; the Corporals were demoted without cause; 
apparent discrimination towards Corporals doing identical job descriptions passed over with 
bias possibly based on likes/dislikes, favoritism, religious intolerance, administrative 
egocentrism, and undisclosed subjective criteria, or whimsical scrutiny. They questioned 
whether other qualified personnel were considered when Yvette Rice was appointed. They 
also alleged "inconsistencies" such as fluctuating eligibility requirements, promoting Yvette 
Rice and Pat Wroe with the uni-division experience and not inter division experience; 
supervisors telling candidates promotional lists would be active for one year from testing not 
the end of one half year due to fiscal calendar year change; varying promotional lists with 
varying candidate placement; perpetration of extreme ethical violations during testing. (R 
791-792) Sheriff Bateman by letter dated December 30, 1996 responded to the December 
17, 1996 meeting with the Deputies . Sheriff Bateman said he found evidence of 
dissatisfaction with departmental promotional policy that is consistent with the issues raised 
under inconsistencies. (R 3 40-3 41) 
The Deputies in January of 1997 filed a grievance with the Utah County Career 
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Service Council(CSC). Pursuant to CSC rules the parties submitted Pre-hearing Outlines 
for a Pre- hearing to establish ground rules, define issues, identify witnesses and ascertain 
stipulations of fact. Utah County alleged the grievance was not timely filed in its Pre-
hearing Outline. (R 78, 1422-1430) At the Pre-hearing the Council, without the benefit of 
a formal motion from the County and/or briefing by the parties, requested the parties to 
briefly address whether the filing of the grievance was done in a timely manner and whether 
it should be heard. This question was addressed by the parties before the CSC along with 
the merits of the case. (R 734-758) By letter dated April 7, 1997 the Council confirmed 
the CSC's decision to proceed in hearing the Deputies grievance on April 23,1997. (R 821) 
Utah County filed a formal Motion to Dismiss based on the Deputies failure to timely file 
an appeal to the CSC on April 17, 1997. (R 1412-1417) The Deputies did not file a 
response. At the April 23, 1997 hearing, the parties addressed the County's motion. After 
argument the Council stated: 
"The Council rules that it is timely filed. We want to be formally on the 
record and we wanted the reasoning to be on the record also. The trigger date 
for the filing was December 17, 1996. It was filed—it was a 90 day period to 
file and it was filed January 10th with Marilyn (inaudible) personnel director 
so that matter is no longer at issue". (R 1476 33) 
The CSC heard evidence and arguments in this matter on April 23, 1997 and May 29, 
1997. (R 1476, 1477) The Council took this matter under advisement and by letter dated 
June 30, 1997 ruled that the Deputies should not be reinstated to the rank of sergeant 
because they never achieved that rank. The CSC, however, recommended that both be 
promoted to the sergeants rank effective immediately, pay at the sergeants level retroactive 
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to December 9, 1991 when the first promotions to sergeants became effective after the Shift 
Supervisor position was eliminated and that the discussion with Sheriff Bateman in 
December 1996 was the date that should drive the time for filing. (R 1142, 1143) Utah 
County filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief in District Court on July 15, 1997. 
Thereafter, the nDeputies filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging the CSC decision was not a 
final appealable order. (R 72) By Order dated October 27, 1997 the Court denied the 
Deputies Motion to Dismiss, but remanded the case to the CSC for Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. (R 118-120) The Remand Order included direction to the CSC. In 
Part C of the Order it stated: 
"That in connection with the entry of such findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, the Council may among other things as it in its discretion may elect: 
... v. Make such changes, additions or modifications to his decision as it may 
deem necessary or desirable; and 
vi. Do such other things and take such further actions as it may deem 
necessary or desirable to clarify or enhance the record of the 
proceedings for eventual review by this Court. (R798, 799) 
Pursuant CSC request, the parties filed Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law on May 8, 1998. On May 26, 1998 the parties filed objections to the others' 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R 1205-1377) Mr. Ryan Beuhring's (the final 
member who heard the evidence) CSC term expired at the end of June 1998. Mr. Beuhring 
continued to serve on the CSC until his replacement was appointed in the fall of 1998, but 
the CSC had still not issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R 221, 222) 
By Memorandum dated November 6, 1998, the CSC informed the parties to submit 
briefs on this matter by November 20, 1998 in preparation for a closed meeting to be held 
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on December 2, 1998 in order to have findings before the end of the year. (R 814) At the 
request of Respondents, the deadline in which to file the additional briefs was extended to 
the 22nd day of March, 1999. (R 784-788) Instead of filing an additional brief in March, the 
Deputies filed an Objection to Filing Further Arguments in the matter. (R 1209) Utah 
County's Memorandum addressing the merits of the case was filed March 22, 1999. (R 
1204) By ruling dated November 22, 1999 the CSC ruled that this case should be heard de 
novo in the district court. (R 1141) Utah County in response thereto filed a Motion to 
Reconsider before the CSC which the Deputies opposed. (R 1159,1154) Without ruling on 
the Motion to Reconsider, and pending the hearing of an Order to Show Cause on April 24, 
2000 regarding compliance with the district court's remand order, the CSC issued a ruling 
dismissing the Deputies' grievance as untimely. (R 1137, 1128) The Deputies objected to 
the CSC April 27, 2000 ruling. The parties briefed and argued the Deputies' objection 
which was sustained by the court on September 12, 2000. The court allowed the parties to 
brief Utah County's Petition for Extraordinary Relief. (R 243) The Deputies for the first 
time in briefing the Petition for Extraordinary Relief argued the discovery rule to support the 
untimely filing of the Deputies' grievance. (R362) Briefing was completed April 13, 2001. 
(R 479) The parties argued the case on July 27, 2001. (R 1433) By Memorandum Decision 
dated September 27, 2001, the district court stated it accorded the Career Service Council 
broad deference in its findings of fact, but will review the Council's conclusions of law for 
correctness. (R 1460) The district court determined that the Deputies' claims were barred 
as a matter of law by the statute of limitations. (R 1454) The court entered an order 
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granting the Petition for Extraordinary Relief, reversing the Utah County Career Service 
Council, and dismissing the Deputies' claim for failure to timely file their grievances before 
the Utah County Career Service Council. (R 1462) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The decision of the CSC is reversible for an abuse of discretion under URCP 
65B(d)(2)(A). The gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard advanced by the Deputies 
for the review of county career service council decisions is not applicable. It is a standard 
employed in extraordinary writs only when the writ would have the effect of circumventing 
a statutorily prohibited appeal. 
Utah County Personnel Rules and Regulations required the Deputies to file a 
grievance with the CSC within three months of the occurrence of the grievance. The 
Deputies failed to do so, and rely on the discovery rule to excuse their failure to timely file. 
However, by the Deputies' and their counsel's argument and testimony, it is clear that the 
Deputies knew or should have known of their cause of action when they were not promoted 
to sergeant in December, 1991, that someone else was and the Deputies believed they were 
the only ones qualified for promotion. The Deputies were on actual if not inquiry notice of 
all the key facts when they found out they were not promoted. The Deputies had access to 
all Personnel job descriptions and rules and regulations and all Sheriff Department manuals 
in addition to participating in the promotion processes. The Deputies failed to pursue their 
claim with reasonable diligence. The Deputies cannot place any alleged promise that it 
would be made right within any limitation period upon which they could reasonably rely in 
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not pursuing a grievance with in the limitation period. The Deputies do not allege any facts 
relevant to a prima facie showing of misleading conduct or fraudulent concealment of key 
facts-who was promoted, and whether they met minimum job qualifications. 
The discovery rule, exceptional circumstances prong is not applicable as this case 
does not concern the performance of a technical service by Utah County and the prejudice 
to Utah County is greater than the hardships imposed by the application of the three month 
limitation of actions. 
Utah County is not estopped from claiming the limitation of actions as no promises 
of making it right, or any promises of promoting the Deputies were made, if at all, during 
or after a limitation period expired. Reliance on any such promise would be unreasonable 
in any event as promoting the Deputies outside of a promotional process would violate merit 
principles which require considering all qualified applicants for a promotion. 
ARGUMENT 
I THE DECISION OF THE CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL IS REVERSIBLE 
FOR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION1 
County's Petition for Extraordinary Relief is brought under Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure(URCP) 65B(d). It states in relevant part, 
Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior court, administrative agency 
or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its 
discretion... The Court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether 
1
 The arbitrary and capricious standard cited by the Deputies does not apply to this 
case. The arbitrary and capricious standard and direct appeal provisions of UCA 17-33-
4(1 )(d) were enacted April 30, 2001 after this case was appealed to the District Court and 
were not argued by the Deputies below. See 2001 Amendment Notes to UCA 17-33-4. 
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the respondent has regularly pursued its authority." URCP 65B(d)(2)(A), 
65B(d)(4). 
The Court must determine whether the CSC exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its 
discretion. The Deputies claim that the CSC may be overturned only for a gross and flagrant 
abuse of discretion is an unwarranted, ill-advised extension of URCP 65B(d)2(A). 
In Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons. 904 P.2d 667 (Utah 1995), because UCA 
§77-27-5(3) prohibits an appeal from Board of Pardon's actions the plaintiff filed an 
Extraordinary Writ of Habeas Corpus seeking to compel the State Board of Pardons to 
advance his parole hearing date. The court in Renn ruled that 
Because the legislature has directed that there be no right of appeal from Board of 
Pardons actions . . . mandamus and certiorari may not be used as a substitute for a 
statutory appeal. Nevertheless, where there is a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion 
and fundamental principles of fairness are flouted, a court may, giving appropriate 
deference to legislative policy and the extraordinarily difficult duties of the Board of 
Pardons, intervene to correct such abuses by means of an appropriate extraordinary 
writ. Id, at 683, 684. 
Pursuant to Renn if an appeal is barred by statute, an extraordinary writ will only lie 
where there is a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion and fundamental principles of fairness 
are flouted. 
State v. Stirba. 972 P. 2d 918 (Utah App. 1998) cited by the Deputies is also similarly 
limited. In Stirba, the state sought to compel Judge Stirba to order over $9,000 in restitution 
to a crime victim. UCA §77-18-8-1 (2)(Supp 1998) precluded the state from appealing Judge 
Stirba's restitution order and the court found that the state may not use a writ of mandamus 
to circumvent this restriction. Stirba, at 920. The statement that an "abuse of discretion for 
Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writs must be much more blatant than the garden variety of abuse of 
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discretion featured in routine appellate review", citing Renn, Stirba, at 922, is limited to 
cases where a writ is sought when an appeal is prohibited. 
While the court in Stirba held that a simple mistake of law does not qualify as the 
kind of gross and flagrant abuse of discretion necessary for Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ to issue, 
the Stirba court, in reaching this conclusion, relied heavily on the fact that 
. . . this proceeding has the same characteristics and seeks the same review and relief, 
as a statutory appeal from Judge Stirba's restitution order. Hence, to avoid 
transforming this action into an impermissible appeal, we must deny the state's 
request for Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) Writ of Mandamus... Based on our determination that 
Judge Stirba [did not abuse] her discretion under Rule 65B(d)(2)(A), coupled with 
our holding that the state's action is tantamount to an impermissible appeal, the 
state's Petition for Extraordinary Writ is hereby denied. Id. at 923. 
The court has only applied the gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard when 
an appeal is statutorily prohibited. In reviewing this matter the court will engage in routine 
appellate review. UCA §17-33-4(l)(d)(Supp 1996) states, "Notwithstanding the other 
provisions of this subsection (1), a right of appeal to the district court under the provisions 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall not be abridged." The instant action is a statutory 
right of appeal and the standard suggested by the Deputies is not applicable. This is 
supported by the fact that oversight of an appointed, volunteer, lay body such as the CSC 
should be more, rather than less, stringent to adequately protect the rights of the parties. 
Neither the Stirba nor Renn provide any guidance or rules to define a gross and flagrant 
abuse of discretion. The gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard advanced by the 
Deputies is also contrary to the clear language of Rule 65B. 
A similar appeal of a CSC decision under URCP 65B(d)(2) was reviewed for an 
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abuse of discretion.2 Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney 818 P.2d 23(Utah App. 1991). 
The Tolman court stated that an abuse of discretion 
. . . is a legal term to indicate that the appellate court is of the opinion that there was 
commission of error of law in the circumstances. It is an improvident exercise of 
discretion; an error of law. . . . An abuse of discretion therefore, is an act by a 
tribunal, not a standard of review in and of itself. A reviewing court discovers such 
acts by applying varying standards of review depending on the error alleged. . . . 
If, however, a party claims that a tribunal has stepped out of the arena of discretion 
and thereby crossed the law, we review using a correction of error standard, giving 
no deference to the tribunal's legal determination. We give no deference to such 
decisions because we are in as good a position as a tribunal to determine the law. 
Obviously the making of a clearly erroneous factual finding is an abuse of discretion 
as is acting unreasonably or misinterpreting the law. In essence a reviewing court 
never overturns a lower tribunal unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Id, at 
26, 27. 
II STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review to be applied by the Court in reviewing statue of limitations 
questions was recently stated in Spears v. Reynolds, 2002 UT 24, ^ 32, a case in which 
opposing counsel was an attorney of record. Therein the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The applicability of a statute of limitations and the applicability of the 
discovery rule are questions of law which we review for correctness. See, 
e.g., Quick Safe-T Hitch, Inc. v. RSB Svs. L.C. 2000 UT 84, [^10, 12 P.3d 
577; dinger v. Kightlv. 791 P2d 868, 869-70(Utah 1990). However, the 
applicability of the statute of limitations and the discovery rule also involves 
a subsidiary factual determination—the point at which a person reasonably 
should know that he or she has suffered a legal injury. This is a question of 
fact. See, e.g., Sew v. Sec. Title Co. of S. Utah, 902 P2d 629, 634 (Utah 
1995); Andreini v. Hultgren. 860 P2d 916, 919 (Utah 1993) (The point at 
which a person reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal 
2
 The CSC is not a policy making body entitled to deference. Utah County is the 
body charged with the administration of the County Personnel Management Act. See 
UCA 17-33-5, 17-33-7. 
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injury is a question of fact.) Accordingly, we review for correctness 
incorporating a clearly erroneous standard of review for the subsidiary factual 
determination of when the Plaintiffs should have known of their alleged legal 
injuries. 
Ill THE DEPUTIES FAILED TO FILE THEIR GRIEVANCE WITHIN THREE 
MONTHS AS REQUIRED BY UTAH COUNTY PERSONNEL RULES AND 
REGULATIONS AND IT IS THEREFORE BARRED 
Section VILE. 1 of the Utah County Office of Personnel Management Rules and 
Regulations (OPMRR) states in relevant part: 
Any career service employee who has completed a . . . probationary period . . . 
having a grievance over merit principles may appeal to the Career Service Council. 
The employee must file a written notice with the personnel director within three 
months from the date of the occurrence . . . 
Filing the appeal with the personnel director within three months is a jurisdictional 
requirement. In Brendle v. City of Draper. 937 P.2d 1044 (Ut. Ct. App 1997) the court held 
that a 14 day time limit to appeal a planning commission decision was jurisdictional, stating 
that the City Council was without jurisdiction to consider a landowners appeal filed after the 
14 day time limit expired. Similarly, an employee having a grievance over merit principles 
must file a written appeal to the CSC within three months from the date of the occurrence 
of the grievance. Failure to do so is jurisdictional. 
The three month time limitation within which an employee must file their appeal to 
the CSC commences when the grievance occurs. 
Generally, a cause of action accrues and the relevant statute of limitations begins to 
run when the last event that will complete the cause of action occurs, and simple 
ignorance of or obliviousness to the existence of a cause of action will not prevent 
the running of the statute of limitations. 
Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds. Inc. 920 P.2d 575. 578 (Utah App. 1996). In Doit Inc. 
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v. Touche. Ross and Company. 926 P.2d 835, 843 (Utah 1996) the Utah Supreme Court 
stated applicable rules on when a cause of action accrues as follows: 
Under Utah law, a statute of limitations begins to run against a party when the cause 
of action accrues.... As a general rule, a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff could 
have first filed and prosecuted an action to successful completion....Once a claim 
accrues, it may not be maintained unless it is commenced within the limitations 
prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations. [Citations omitted] 
In the instant matter, the Deputies grievance occurred when the promotion decisions 
for jail sergeant were made in December of 1991 and subsequent years. After the 
promotions occurred, the Deputies had three months within which to file a grievance with 
the CSC. The Deputies failed to appeal promotion decisions within three months of the 
promotions, and they cannot be permitted to pursue such claims more than five years after 
the 1991 promotions and outside of 3 months of any other promotions. 
Since no promotion decision was made in the three months prior to January 10,1997, 
when the Deputies filed their request for CSC review, the Deputies' claims are therefore 
barred by the 3 month limitation of actions. 
IV IT WOULD BE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS TO DETERMINE THAT THE 
DEPUTIES DID NOT KNOW OF AND COULD NOT REASONABLY HAVE 
KNOWN OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION WITHIN THE 
LIMITATION PERIOD 
Generally a cause of action accrues and the relevant statue of limitations begins to run 
'upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of 
action... [and] mere ignorance of the existence of the cause of action does not prevent 
the running of the statute of limitations'. However in certain instances the discovery 
rule allows for the tolling of the statute of limitations'until the discovery of facts 
forming the basis for the cause of action'. 
This court has recognized three circumstances where the discovery rule 
applies: (1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) in 
situations where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of 
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the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in situations where the 
case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule would 
be irrational or unjust regardless of any showing that the defendant has prevented the 
discovery of the cause of action. 
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1128, 1129 (Utah 1992). 
"If the discovery rule applies, the applicable statute of limitations is held to have 
commenced running only at the time the plaintiff first knew or should have known the facts 
giving rise to the cause of action". Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 
578 (Utah App. 1996). In order to consider the discovery rule, "an initial showing must be 
made that the plaintiff did not know of and could not reasonably have known of the 
existence of the cause of action in time to file a claim within the limitation period." Warren 
v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992); Sevev v. Security Title Company, 
902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 1995); O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139, 
1144 (Utah 1991). 
The limitation period is postponed only by the belated discovery of key facts and not 
by delayed discovery of legal theories. To determine whether a plaintiff should have 
discovered the facts forming the basis of a cause of action two concepts must be 
considered, inquiry notice and reasonable diligence. Was the plaintiff on notice that 
she might have a cause of action and if so was she reasonably diligent in 
investigating the facts surrounding the loss. 
As to inquiry notice, cthe test is whether the plaintiff has information of 
circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry... 
Where the circumstances are such as to suggest to a person of ordinary intelligence 
the probability that he has been defrauded, the duty of inquiry arises, and if he omits 
that inquiry when it would have developed the truth, and shuts his eyes to the facts 
which call for investigation, knowledge of the fraud will be imputed to him'. 
Anderson, at 579. 
To invoke the discovery rule, therefore, it is necessary for the Deputies to show that 
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within the limitation period they did not know and could not reasonably have known that 
they were not promoted in 1991, and that the promoted deputies did not meet minimum job 
qualifications. 
The Deputies advance the following in support of a finding that they did not know 
or should not have known of the cause of action before December, 1996. The discovery in 
December of 1996 of illegal testing activities. Sheriff Bateman's December 30th 1996 
pronouncement that Shift Supervisor was never a ranked position. That the Sheriff had 
acted on a false premise in every promotional testing process utilized by the Department 
since the elimination of the Shift Supervisor rank, that Shift Supervisor was never a ranked 
position. The Sheriff acknowledged for the first time in December 1996 that there had been 
inconsistencies in the Department's promotional process. The Deputies were repeatedly 
assured by Department management that they would be treated fairly as a result of the 
reclassification of their positions and the Sheriff assured them that he would make things 
right. The Deputies were urged by the Department to resolve their issues internally, feeling 
considerable institutional pressure for them to do so. Unbeknownst to the Deputies until 
December 1996, the promotion and eligibility requirements fluctuated widely and were often 
disregarded by Department management. (Brief of Appellant, page 26, 27) 
These considerations are simply not relevant to when the Deputies discovered the key 
facts-that the Deputies were not promoted in December 1991 and that deputies not meeting 
minimum requirements were promoted to Jail Sergeant in December 1991. 
Anything concerning the fairness of the testing process, procedural irregularities 
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or whether testing policies were followed is not relevant. A finding that the testing process 
did not comply with policy would not result in the Deputies promotion to sergeant. Any 
such finding would result in setting aside the promotion and conducting a new process 
meeting required policies. This the Deputies did not request. They requested promotion. 
The alleged irregularities are irrelevant as to whether the Deputies were the only qualified 
deputies to be promoted to Jail Sergeant in 1991. 
The discovery through Mr. Martin's conversation with Sergeant Morgan of alleged 
testing improprieties concerned a non ranked patrol position and is unrelated to the Deputies 
or the 1991 promotions. The date of Mr. Martin's conversation with Sgt. Morgan is not in 
the CSC record. The Deputies alleged the date of this conversation for the first time when 
this matter was briefed in the District Court. Sheriff Bateman's December 30, 1996 
"admission" to the Deputies claimed "inconsistencies" in promotion policy is also not 
relevant to whether the Deputies should have been promoted in December 1991. Sheriff 
Bateman's December 30, 1996 response was not in the record when the CSC decided this 
matter. Sheriff Bateman's December 30, 1996 response was added to the record in June of 
1998 over Utah County's objection after this matter was remanded to the CSC for Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R 815, 816, 794, 768) 
The following alleged circumstances are also equally irrelevant to the question of 
who was promoted to Jail sergeant in 199land whether they met minimum qualifications. 
Discovering in the December 1996 letter that the Sheriff did not consider Shift Supervisor 
to be a department wide rank or that they had not been given due credit for Shift Supervisor 
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experience in past promotional processes. The Sheriff in the same letter advised that the 
Deputies had been given consideration for their supervisory experience and would continue 
to do so. Whether promotion or eligibility requirements fluctuated or were disregarded. The 
alleged concealment of promotion registers. The registers have nothing to do with minimum 
qualifications. The Deputies knew who was promoted and did not need the register to know 
who was. Alleged assurances the Deputies would be treated fairly and encouraging the 
Deputies to resolve their issues internally. The alleged institutional pressure or 
determination that it would be better for their careers to not rock the boat. Encouraging the 
Deputies to apply for promotion. There simply are no facts alleged that have any relevance 
to when the Deputies first discovered or should have discovered they were not promoted, 
who was promoted, and whether the promoted employees met the minimum qualifications 
for jail sergeant. 
If the Court finds any of the above allegations relevant, the review of the record on 
whether the Deputies made the required threshold showing before the CSC is problematical. 
The discovery rule was raised by the Deputies for the first time in the District Court. At the 
beginning of the April 23, 1997 hearing after Utah County's Motion to Dismiss was argued 
by the parties the Council ruled 
With regards to the issue of the timely filing of this particular grievance, the Council 
rules that it is timely filed. We want that to be formally on the record, and we wanted 
the reasoning to be on the record also. The trigger date for the filing was December 
17, 1996. It was filed—it was a 90 day period to file, it was filed January 10 with 
Marilyn (inaudible) Personnel Director, so that matter is no longer at issue." (R1476 
33) 
The Council also ruled in the June 30, 1997 written decision 
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The Council would also like to reconfirm that we did not feel like this hearing should 
be barred because of the timeliness of filing. We felt like your discussion with 
Sheriff Bateman in December, 1996 was the date that should drive the time for filing. 
You filed within ninety days of that date, therefore, we proceeded with the hearing. 
The Deputies raise the discovery rule in an attempt for the Court to uphold the CSCs 
decisions on other grounds. In light of the imprecise CSC findings, Utah County will 
attempt to marshal the evidence in favor of a finding that the trigger date for the filing was 
December 17,1996 and the discussion with Sheriff Bateman in December 1996 was the date 
that should drive the time for filing. 
The Deputies' arguments at the Pre-hearing and April 23, 1997 hearings are not 
evidence and should not be considered by the court in determining whether the record 
supports a finding that the Deputies reasonably first discovered their cause of action on 
December 17, 1996. Neither should the court consider the Deputies December 17, 1996 
outline and the Sheriffs December 30, 1996 response thereto which were added to the 
record over the objection of County after the CSC decision while this matter was on remand. 
County nevertheless has marshaled these arguments and evidence if the Court finds them 
relevant. 
A. EVIDENCE/ARGUMENT SUPPORTING THE DEPUTIES CLAIMS 
Unless otherwise noted the following evidence/arguments were argued by the 
Deputies or their counsel, or are from the Deputies' testimony. 
Pre-hearing argument-The Deputies relied in good faith on the Sheriffs promises that this 
would be made good, they believed their Sheriff when he said he would make it good on it 
and handle it internally. (R 754) The reason it was not filed in 1991 was that some promise 
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was given by the Sheriff that the matter would be taken care of, the last meeting they had, 
the Sheriff said that when he said he would make good on it was in December of 1996, the 
first time that he actually in writing responded and said he would not be doing anything (R 
752, 753) The case concerns the 1991 demotion and the ongoing testing process and 
inconsistencies that have occurred over the years. The Sheriff didn't respond at that point 
negatively to our case. (R 751) The Deputies in the two years prior to 1997 were told to 
bide their time that it would be made right. (R 751) In 1991 a salary survey was done. The 
Deputies had to figure out for themselves that they were being disciplined and that took a 
period of time. (R 744) The Deputies understood they had to go up their chain of command 
and did not realize that they should go separately and file a formal grievance. (R 743) Their 
understanding of the policy is that you go up the chain of command. They understood that 
there's a process you do within before you go without. (R 743) The Deputies were unable 
to determine whether the candidates had been certified as being eligible and in fact they were 
not. When the register was subsequently formed, they were never given access to the 
register. That was held in confidence by the Sheriff. It was never posted, nobody actually 
knew where they were, where they placed on the register. When the Deputies filed this 
grievance and requested documentation, the Sheriff did come forth and find the registers and 
submit them to the Deputies. The Deputies were not able to gain access to the registers for 
many years until the grievance was filed. (R 742, 743) 
April 23. 1997 hearing argument - Sheriff Bateman made promises to the Deputies that 
he would make it right, we can handle this internally, I'll make it right and give promises. 
22 
(R 1476 14) The Deputies tried to be team players by believing the Sheriff when he says 
he'll make it right. (R1476 15) The Deputies relied on his promises to make it right. (R 
1476 17) In December of 1996 the Sheriff indicated that if he could prove these 
commitments had been made he would make the situation right. The Sheriff made the 
commitment in his office that if he could find these commitments had been made that he 
would make it right not only make it right in the sense of promote us to Sergeant (R 1476 
22, 23) In December of 1996 Sheriff Bateman represented to the Deputies that he would 
investigate their allegations and if he was able to determine their allegations were accurate, 
he would do what he could to make it right. (R1476 26) December 1996 was the first time 
Sheriff Bateman put in writing you are getting no relief. They relied on promises made by 
Captain Quarnberg to them who was their superior. It's not quite right for the Sheriff to 
come in here and wash his hands of the matter when the people below him and yet above 
these Deputies make promises that they will be made right to appease them meanwhile the 
clock is ticking. (R 1476 30) The Deputies trusted their Sheriff when he made promises 
whether it was himself or through his subordinates who are their superiors that it would be 
made right. (R 1476 31) 
April 23,1997 hearing evidence - Sgt. Mike Morgan was supervising a number of people 
in the jail division while a testing procedure was taking place for a lateral transfer from other 
areas into patrol. An individual called him and asked him for input on questions he was 
formulating for the test. The questions were given over the phone and Sgt. Morgan wrote 
them down. After talking about the questions for some time and also about a specific 
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candidate that Sgt. Morgan was supervising at the jail, the candidate's qualifications and 
whether he would make a good patrol deputy was discussed. At the end of the conversation, 
the individual said, "Well, I guess if you left these questions on your desk and somebody 
walked in and happened to see them when you weren't in there, you couldn't be held 
responsible for that." Sgt, Morgan responded, "Well, I'm not going to do that, and we went 
on and talked about a couple of other things." After the conversation, Sgt. Morgan shredded 
the questions. Sometime later on an unspecified date, Sgt. Morgan related the experience 
to Mr. Martin in an attempt to persuade him that the testing procedures in patrol that Sgt. 
Morgan had been involved in were one hundred percent credible, very objective and not 
subjective in trying to secure certain people. (R1476 193-196) 
May 29,1997 hearing evidence - In September or October of 1991 Mr. Martin was told 
there were no more Shift Supervisors, to stay where you were until the actual changes were 
made.(R 1477 17) The Department failed to establish eligibility lists or appointment 
registers and make them available to applicants. Exhibit O, the 1991 sergeant register, was 
never made public and the Deputies did not obtain it until they requested it of the Sheriff. 
Nobody had any idea where they had placed on an eligible register. They had only seen it 
in connection with the grievance. (R 1477 69) People have been promoted without there 
ever being a register and positions were filled with a secret process. (R 1477 77) Over the 
two years prior to 1977, Sergeant testing was exclusive to the jail and a jail only sergeant's 
position. In approximately 1995 Mr. Alexanderson informed the Sheriff that he thought it 
was unfair that he had to basically test again to try to regain the ground that he already held. 
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Sheriff Bateman said he understood his position, but didn't agree with it and also said, 
Go ahead and bide your time. If you want to test for a position that comes available 
in another part of the Department, when that position becomes available you'll be 
afforded the opportunity to test." And I was willing to do that. I was willing to let 
the water under the bridge, you know, be under the bridge. I bided my time, I spun 
my wheels for another two years. There were only two processes that took place in 
1995 and 1996 and again, those were exclusive to the jail. The one in 1995 I did 
participate in, the two I think that occurred in 19961 did not with the understanding 
that when a position became available I would be able to test for it. (R 1477 78, 79) 
Many of the registers are kept confidential. You can't get one unless you either 
request to see it and again if I didn't get the promotion, I don't even want to look at the 
register, that's just me. In numerous promotional announcements they say that the registers 
will not be made available. They will be held in confidence. (R 1477 81) Mr. 
Alexanderson responded, when being asked why he waited five years to bring this complaint 
"Because as I stated I tried to be a loyal employee I thought the Sheriff was doing the right 
thing. (R 1477 98-99) 
Evidence submitted after CSC decision while case on remand - On December 17, 1996 the 
Deputies met with Sheriff Bateman to discuss long held concerns contained in an outline 
(supra p. 6, 7) about promotions and possible corruption within the Department and 
requested that the Sheriff investigate and provide the Deputies a remedy. (R 791, 792) In 
Sheriff Bateman's response thereto he stated, 
The issue of automatic advancement of Shift Supervisors is not warranted because 
the position of Shift Supervisor was never a ranked position. It was rather a 
temporary solution to supervision problems in limited areas of the Sheriffs Office, 
primarily the jail. Shift Supervisors were allowed to wear corporal stripes as a way 
of visually recognizing their supervisory status, but was never intended as the 
creation of an office wide ranked structure. . . . 
... Deputy in charge and Shift Supervisor experience have been considered as 
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part of the evaluation process and will continue to be considered. . . . 
I do find evidence of your dissatisfaction with departmental promotional 
policy that is consistent with issues raised under "inconsistencies" . . . 
... Inconsistencies have occurred, but only in an attempt to be as fair and 
impartial as possible. Each time a promotional opportunity has been available, things 
have been learned that I believe have allowed us to do a better job the next time. The 
new process being put in place in 1997 will, I hope, establish a system that will 
eliminate the past inconsistencies. (R340, 341) 
The foregoing argument/evidence is deficient of any relevant facts supporting a claim 
that the Deputies did not know or could not have known of the key facts - that they were not 
promoted in December 1991, that someone who did not meet minimum qualifications had 
been and the Deputies believed they were the only applicants meeting minimum 
qualifications. The Deputies knew or were on inquiry notice of the key facts. This is amply 
demonstrated by the following evidence/argument. Unless otherwise noted, the following 
argument/evidence is from the Deputies and their Counsel. 
B CONFLICTING AND CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE/ARGUMENT 
Pre-hearing argument- The job description that we were holding, Shift Supervisor, was 
attributed as Sergeant in the salary survey.(R 745, 746) The Deputies were left as Acting 
Sergeants from July of 1991 to December of 1991. (R 745) The Deputies brought up their 
complaint about the whole process or lack of process time and time again, (R 752, 753) The 
grievance was made known to the Sheriff in 1991 by Mr. Martin. (R 751) Mr. Martin spoke 
with the Sheriff on several occasions personally and wrote him a long letter in April of 1992 
after it became clear what was going on. The reclassification of deputies was done in 
violation of some policies and we couldn't understand why they were violating the policies. 
Two of the Shift Supervisors that we served with were moved up to Sergeants rank. Mr. 
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Alexanderson moved out to Patrol when it was made clear to him that he was not going to 
be moved up to avoid the chagrin of having to go back on a shift. Mr. Martin went back on 
a shift and had to train his new Sergeant. They brought in someone that was unqualified in 
violation of some policies that we can show. (R 745, 746) In and around December of 
1991 there were complaints that are documented. Mr. Martin did not file a formal 
complaint at that time as he felt that the situation was going to right itself as soon as the 
promotions started to become consistent and/or recognized that we were the qualified 
competent people logical for the next Sergeants positions, when in fact they started opening 
up and changing the career ladder and doing some alterations that affected that whole 
situation and that's when it started to become clear, and that's when in about April of 1992 
which was four months from the promotions. (R 743, 744) The Sheriff was the only one 
that could answer certain questions and he was on notice from the get go that they had a 
complaint about the process. (R 743) 
April 23, 1997 hearing argument- Mr. Martin was told he's not allowed to wear his 
second stripe in December of 1991 the first he knew that he had been demoted.(R1476 15) 
In December 1996 was when the Sheriff beyond the letter dated 1992 put something in 
writing saying basically I'm doing nothing for you. (R1476 16) The Deputies were advised 
the job they were doing is equivalent to that of a Sergeant however we are going to eliminate 
the Shift Supervisor position and make Sergeants in those positions instead of taking the 
Shift Supervisors competently doing the job. They said okay we're going to open it up to 
eligible Corrections Specialists with other kinds of criteria with different backgrounds. They 
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expanded the criteria for eligibility to get the Shift Sergeant position which was replacing 
the Shift Supervisor position. We at the time didn't think that was fair, however it was not 
portrayed to us as a disciplinary action. We said okay, we're going to reclassify everybody 
and we're going to promote from the greater pool including some Correction Specialists. 
I had real trouble with that at the time because here I was supervising and training and 
evaluating and managing the Jail and watching over personnel and now I had to compete 
against those personnel to get basically my old job back which was a Shift Supervisor now 
Shift Sergeant position. (R 1476 18, 19) Mr. Martin made his dissatisfactions vocal to 
Captain Quarnberg, the Bureau Chief, and Sheriff Bateman and wrote Sheriff Bateman the 
letter. (R 1476 19) Mr. Martin was moved back onto a shift "Just take your rank you're 
being absorbed back onto a shift" and at that time I thought that it was wrong because here 
I had been doing the supervisory job for 4 lA years, there's no discernable difference in the 
job description change, yet they are taking me out of the position absent disciplinary action 
or any kind of rationale I could see. (R 1476 20) At the time Mr. Martin was disgruntled. 
He was on a team and went along with it because he believed that because the policy said 
that you needed a year as a Shift Supervisor to be promoted, any further promotions that 
came down the pipe were going to be a shoe in because I was one of the only few people 
who had Shift Supervisor experience. (R 1476 21, 22) Numerous statements were made 
in Shift Supervisor meeting where there would be automatic advancement of the current 
Shift Supervisors into the position of Sergeant. (R 1476 22) When promises were made in 
Shift Supervisor meeting the Deputies were under the understanding quite rightfully that 
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they were the only qualified individuals so that they were going to be the two made Sergeant 
and they were not. (R 1476 28) 
April 23, 1997 hearing evidence-By letter dated April 22, 1992 Mr. Martin raised the 
following issues with Sheriff Bateman. Mr. Martin was troubled by his unreasonable 
placement on the promotion list; the most recent promotional process was a popularity 
contest based on perceptions about individual personalities and promotability instead of an 
objective analyzation of day to day task accomplishments and true ability; the salary survey 
showed that Shift Supervisors in the Jail were doing a job comparable to Sergeants in other 
divisions and indeed attributed the Sergeant rank to the Shift Supervisor job description with 
no significant alteration; all active Shift Supervisors should have been promoted to the new 
rank automatically unless there was specific cause to revoke supervisory status; Shift 
Supervisor Corporals who were not promoted were effectively demoted. (R 907) Mr. Martin 
realized he actually had been demoted, lost rank, supervisory authority and apparently all 
recognition received as a Shift Supervisor; in December of 1991 Captain Quarnberg told 
him he placed second to the bottom on the final roster. He attempted to justify Mr. Martin's 
low placement by saying that he was a worker not a leader. (R 906) He takes issue with the 
promotion into a position over me of any line deputy he supervised and evaluated. His 
experience as a Shift Supervisor (as established in Jail Policy and Procedure 150.02) 
designates him as a more logical and qualified choice for the position of Jail Sergeant than 
any line deputy without Shift Supervisor experience, irregardless of the recent promotional 
assessment. His supervisory experience cannot be forgotten or trivialized and his promotion 
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to Corporal was never rescinded and must be given due consideration in any promotional 
process. (R 905) Mr. Martin could only surmise that he had been attacked behind his back 
by someone or some group with enough administrative clout to influence the promotions 
rather than strictly evaluating performances measured against standardized guidelines. 
Perhaps his style of leadership, his feelings about politics, his religious beliefs, or any of the 
million other subjective perceptions became part of the criteria for evaluating him. The 
Sheriffs Department constantly changing promotional process was transformational and 
whimsical not predictable and calculable; the promotional criteria and procedure are 
changed so much and so often creating such disparity from one promotion to the next; 
promotional ground rules constantly change, the Sheriffs Department needs standardization, 
objective promoting, and to follow written policies. (R 904) He lost earned rank, 
recognition, authority and wage difference between Deputy and Sergeant. (R 903) 
By letter dated April 22,1992 Sheriff Bateman replied to Mr. Martin's letter. Sheriff 
Bateman responded that he was not convinced that Mr. Martin's perceptions were accurate. 
Two promotion cycles ago he was approached in writing by all individuals eligible for 
promotion at the time and under the auspices of the Deputies Association to eliminate the 
objective and competitive process the Sheriffs Department was using. It was too stressful 
and the applicants would rather the Sheriff just make the selections for the open positions. 
Sheriff Bateman stated that the majority of those being considered for promotion have been 
satisfied with the new selection process and absent feedback to the contrary he would 
continue to honor the request to not use the more objective and competitive process used in 
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the past. Sheriff Bateman invited Mr. Martin to work through the Deputies Association to 
bring about a change if sentiments have changed. (R 908). 
May 29, 1997 hearing evidence- In September or October of 1991 Mr. Martin was told 
there were no more Shift Supervisors, to stay where you were until the actual changes were 
made. (R 1477 17) At the end of December they came in with new job descriptions, now 
you can stop wearing your two stripes and promoted Bonnie Herkimer, Mark Binks, and the 
Deputies were absorbed back onto the Shifts. (R 1477 18) Mr. Alexanderson saw this 
coming when they started talking about just promoting two Sergeants and made 
arrangements to go to Patrol. Mr. Martin went back on a shift and trained his new Sergeant. 
Mr. Martin was told off and on for months leading up to the point where they actually said 
there are no Shift Supervisors. (R 1477 18) There is no discemable difference between the 
functions of Shift Supervisors that they're performing and the Sergeants. (R 1477 19) It 
was Mr. Alexanderson's understanding when the news first came that Shift Supervisor was 
going to be eliminated that those who were serving in that capacity would be promoted to 
Sergeant based on inseemingly assurances throughout the years that they had talked about 
upgrading that position to Sergeant (R 1477 19-20) Dennis Howard a Patrol Deputy was 
promoted and became Mr. Martin's Sergeant. (R 1477 21) According to the policies at the 
time and the job descriptions we felt that we were qualified if not more qualified than Mark 
Binks and Herkimer in as much that we were Peace Officer Certified. We were confused 
because there was no testing. (R 1477 21-22) Mr. Martin understood the minimum 
qualifications of the Jail Sergeant at that time were Shift Supervisor for one year, Peace 
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Officer Certified and a college degree. (R 1477 22) He came to that understanding through 
a job description outlined in the Sheriffs Department Policy and Procedure Manual (Exhibit 
G) requiring Peace Officer Certification and minimum hiring requirements of the jail. 
Exhibit G, a description of the minimum qualifications for the Jail Sergeant position at the 
time that Herkimer and Binks were promoted as Jail Sergeants, was available to all officers 
that were interested in being promoted to Sergeant. (R 1477 22,23) Mr. Martin understood 
Bonnie Herkimer was not POST Certified at the time of her promotion as he remembers her 
having to go to POST after that to go up and get her certification. (R 1477 30) Mr. Howard 
at the time of promotion was not a Shift Supervisor for a year. (R 1477 30) Mr. Martin 
learned Binks and Herkimer were promoted when he saw them wearing Sergeant's rank 
around the time he was told vaguely in the control room he didn't need to wear his rank 
anymore. (R 1477 32) Mr. Howard when promoted had not served as a Shift Supervisor 
and was trained by Mr. Martin. (R 1477 33-34) In December Captain Quarnberg told Mr. 
Martin I view you as a worker not a leader so you're not getting promoted to the Sergeant 
positions. (R 1477 34) In April or May of 1992 Mr. Martin transferred out of the jail. He 
was humiliated and wanted to get out of the situation. (R 1477 35) When the Shift 
Supervisor position was eliminated Mr. Martin complained to his supervisors that what 
about the policy that requires one year of Shift Supervisor experience which had not been 
rescinded. At the time he went to his Sergeant. He said how can they do this. They are 
eliminating our ranked position. They're going to put Sergeant's in the exact same position. 
(R 1477 52-53) Mr. Martin has always had access to the Jail Manual and the Sheriffs 
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Office Manual and the Personnel Manual. (R 1477 54) 
Mr. Alexanderson testified in December of 1991 he was called into Captain 
Quarnberg's office and told the promotion list is coming out tomorrow and you're not on 
it. Prior to the time he met with Captain Quarnberg he expected to receive a Sergeant job 
based on numerous assurances, commitments in Shift Supervisor meetings. (R 1477 58) 
They all expected to become Sergeants after the salary survey. The job description was 
rewritten. The job description remained the same only the title changed. (R 1477 60) 
Bonnie Herkimer and Mark Binks were not certified peace officers when promoted to 
Sergeant which he understood to be a minimum qualification. (R 1477 61-63) The 
Deputies submitted their letter and their resumes and basically thought "this is it the stripes 
are coming - or the additional stripe is coming. We've met all the requirements, we've got 
all the qualifications this is just something that is some sort of a requirement." (R 1477 64) 
The Deputies were advised in the September 6, 1991 Shift Supervisor meeting that Shift 
Supervisors had been eliminated, that everyone would remain where they were for the time 
being. (R 1477 70, 109-111) Dennis Howard, when promoted to Sergeant in 1991, had 
correctional experience, did not have a college degree and had never been a Shift 
Supervisor. (R 1477 72) The same night Mr. Alexanderson was told he was not going to 
be on the promotional list he was offered a patrol spot and snapped it up because he was 
embarrassed, humiliated, had been promoted, had his rank revoked, reneged, negated 
without reason whatsoever and opted to save a little bit of face when they offered the 
opportunity and he got out of there and went to patrol. (R 1477 75-76) Mr. Alexanderson 
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did not apply for Sergeants openings in the two years prior to 1997 because over the last two 
years testing for the Jail position of Sergeant was exclusive to the Jail. The person being 
promoted to the rank of Sergeant when the test was being administered by the Jail was in all 
likelihood going to remain in the jail for the rest of his career. In a conversation in the two 
years prior to filing the grievance Mr. Alexanderson informed the Sheriff that he thought it 
was unfair that he had to test again to try to regain the ground he already held. Sheriff 
Bateman said he understood his position, he necessarily didn't agree with it but he 
understood it ( p. 24, 25, supra, R 1477 78-79) When Mr. Alexanderson was told he was 
not going to be promoted he was floored, tears came to his eyes, he said thank you got up 
and left. Since that time he's not been given explanations for not being promoted. Many of 
the registers were kept confidential or you can't get one unless you either request to see it, 
and again if he didn't get the promotion he didn't even want to look at the register. (R 1477 
80-81) 
When the deputies requested that Sheriff Bateman forego formal testing in 1994 Mr. 
Alexanderson refused to sign the petition saying the testing should be waived. He didn't 
think it was appropriate and instead of asserting his rights at that time he let it go. Mr. 
Alexanderson responded when being asked why he waited five years to bring this complaint 
I had conversations with the Sheriff indicating my displeasure at having to test to 
regain the ground I had held in the Jail and I was willing to let bygones be bygones, 
even to let my demotion go in order to be eligible to test when the position became 
available in an area I was interested in up to 1996 and that's what the plan was. (R 
1477 98-99) 
Mr. Binks was in the Academy in 1991 and was told that he had made Sergeant a couple 
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days before his actual graduation from the Police Academy. (R 1477 185) 
Based on the foregoing facts any finding that the Deputies first knew or should have 
known of their cause of action when they met with Sheriff Bateman in December 1996 is 
clearly erroneous. By their own statements the Deputies were on notice of and felt that they 
were clearly wronged by their reclassification to corrections specialist from Shift Supervisor 
and failure to be promoted to sergeant in 1991. When they learned they were not promoted 
in December of 1991, they believed they were the only qualified applicants for jail sergeant. 
The Deputies participated in the promotion process and knew who was promoted. They had 
access to all relevant Personnel, Sheriffs Department and Jail Rules, Regulations, Policies 
and Procedures. 
The Deputies were on inquiry notice as early as August 15, 1991 when Sheriff 
Bateman, by memo notified all employees that all Shift Supervisors were to be eliminated, 
that those filling Shift Supervisor positions would automatically be reclassified to deputy 
Sheriff III or corrections specialist without an associated pay loss and that sergeants' 
positions would need to be filled if the salary survey is implemented, would be open to all 
eligible employees and any eligible employee would be required to submit a resume to be 
considered. Exhibit 5. Shift Supervisors were notified on August 22, 1991 in a Shift 
Supervisor meeting that the salary survey was placed on hold and it could not be adopted 
until the County Commission approved it, but that the salary survey would most likely go 
into effect the first of October or first of the year and that promotions would be held up 
because of the salary survey, but that the Department would go ahead with promotion 
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applications. Exhibit P. Captain Quarnberg advised all Shift Supervisors in a Shift 
Supervisor meeting of September 6, 1991 that there were now no Shift Supervisors. Exhibit 
B. Notice was given in the September 19, 1991 Shift Supervisors' meeting that the salary 
survey was approved by the Commission. Exhibit C. Notice was given in the October 3, 
1991 Shift Supervisor meeting that Personnel had the list ready to go regarding promotions 
and that the list would be sent out to evaluate each person and start the interview process. 
Exhibit D. 
The Deputies were on actual notice of the facts forming the basis of their cause of 
action in December 1991. At the very least the Deputies were informed of circumstances 
sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry and did nothing for 5 years. There has been 
no showing why the Deputies could not have discovered much sooner what they claimed to 
discover from their meeting with Sheriff Bateman in 1996. 
The Deputies claim that they did not learn of their grievance until their December 
1996 meeting with Sheriff Bateman is unsupported. The Deputies' December 17, 1996 
outline was presented to Sheriff Bateman in their meeting of the same date. The outline 
raised most, if not all of the issues raised in this matter (p. 5,6, supra). 
As evidenced by the December 1996 outline and Mr. Martin's April 1992 letter, 
before the Deputies ever went to talk to Sheriff Bateman, they were on inquiry or actual 
notice asserting most if not all of the claims brought in the instant matter. As argued above, 
(supra, p. 18-20) the claimed discoveries, Sheriff Bateman's "admissions" to 
uinconsistencies"on December 30th, 1996, and the alleged discovery of testing irregularities, 
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are not relevant or key facts. The Deputies complained about testing procedures far before 
December of 1996 as evidenced by the complaints regarding testing procedures in Mr. 
Martin's April 22, 1992 letter and Mr. Alexanderson's refusal to sign a waiver of testing 
procedures in 1994. They were put on inquiry notice long before their meeting with the 
Sheriff in December of 1996. 
The Deputies discovered nothing in their discussion with Sheriff Bateman in 
December of 1996 which they could not have previously discovered through the exercise 
of reasonable diligence had they pursued their claims after the 1991 and subsequent 
promotional processes. There is nothing in the record to show what key facts the Deputies 
learned in or after their meeting with Sheriff Bateman, and why whatever is alleged to have 
been learned in or after the meeting with Sheriff Bateman should not have been discovered 
long ago through the exercise of reasonable diligence. 
Where the circumstances are such as to suggest to a person of ordinary intelligence 
the probability that he has been defrauded, the duty of inquiry arises, and if he omits 
that inquiry when it would have developed the truth, and shuts his eyes to the facts 
which call for investigation, knowledge of the fraud will be imputed to him\ 
Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds. Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 579 (Utah App. 1996) 
Through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the Deputies could have and should 
have investigated whether they were correctly reclassified to corrections specialists when 
the Shift Supervisor position was eliminated, whether appropriate procedures were followed 
in the 1991 and subsequent sergeants promotions and whether individuals promoted to 
sergeant in the jail or elsewhere possessed necessary minimum qualifications. The Deputies 
knew who was promoted and participated in the processes. The Deputies could have made 
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a request under the Government Records Access Management Act for any documents 
including eligibility and promotion registers they felt were necessary to their investigation. 
Registers were not concealed as the Deputies did not request them. There is no evidence 
that they requested registers and were turned down. They could have obtained copies of the 
revised job descriptions containing minimum job qualifications. There is no claim that the 
County concealed any of these facts from the Deputies. Everything necessary to pursue 
their claims was known or easily available to them in December 1991. Mr. Martin, in his 
April 1992 letter to Sheriff Bateman, refers to JPPM section 150, the very section the 
Deputies claim was violated in 1991 and subsequent promotions. Exhibit 2. Yet no claim 
was filed for more than 5 years. Certainly an impermissible time period given the three 
month limitation of actions. 
The Deputies as early as August of 1991 but no later than December 1991 were on 
inquiry notice. Had they investigated the matter then as they did in 1996, they could then 
have decided to bring a claim within the limitations period at a time when the memories of 
the personnel director, Sheriff, and Sheriffs personnel involved in the promotion process 
were fresh, prior to the loss of registers and documents used in the promotional process, 
prior to memories fading, evidence being lost, and witnesses being unavailable. (R 1476, 
145, 146. R 1477 166, 167, 170, 174) 
Because the Deputies knew of and should reasonably have known of the existence 
of the grievance when they were not promoted, or on or before Mr. Martin's April 1992 
letter, or two years prior to bringing the cause of action when Mr. Alexanderson approached 
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the Sheriff regarding Jail Sergeant promotions, the discovery rule is not applicable to extend 
the limitation of actions from commencing in December of 1991. The same is true for all 
alleged deficiencies in promotional processes or qualifications of candidates promoted. 
Instead of pursuing their claims the Deputies chose to do nothing. They felt it better to not 
rock the boat than to assert their claimed rights and having made that decision, cannot now 
change their mind and attempt to revive long expired claims. Given the duty of inquiry, the 
Deputies did not with reasonable diligence pursue their grievance 
The Deputies failed to make the initial showing that they did not know of and could 
not reasonably have known of the existence of the cause of action in time to file a claim 
within the three month limitation period. Having failed to make this initial showing, the 
Court should not consider whether the discovery rule is applicable. 
V THE FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT PRONG OF THE DISCOVERY 
RULE IS NOT SATISFIED. 
If the Court determines the Deputies did not know or should not have known of their 
cause of action until December 1996, the Discovery Rule applies "where the Defendant 
concealed the facts or misled the claimant, and as a result, the claimant did not become 
aware of the cause of action until after the limitation period had run." Warren v. Provo City 
Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992) 
.. . The concealment version of the discovery rule is essentially a claim of equitable 
estoppel, whereby a defendant who causes a delay in bringing a cause of action is 
estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a defense to the action. As is 
true in all cases of equitable estoppel for the doctrine to be invoked, a showing must 
be made that under the circumstances the party claiming estoppel has acted in a 
reasonable manner. Therefore in order to invoke the concealment version of the 
discovery rule, it must be shown that given the defendant's actions, a reasonable 
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plaintiff would not have brought suit within the statutory period. Warren v. Provo 
City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129, 1130 (Utah 1992). 
For the concealment prong of the discovery rule to apply, a plaintiff must "make a 
prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then demonstrate that given the 
defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the claim earlier". 
Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds. Inc.. 920 P.2d 575, 578, 579(Utah App. 1996) 
From the facts previously discussed there is no claim that the Sheriff Department 
fraudulently concealed any key facts about when and who was promoted or what their 
qualifications were. The Deputies were on inquiry notice and had access to all relevant 
rules, regulations, policies and procedures. The Deputies simply cannot make the required 
primae facie showing of fraudulent concealment of key facts. For the discovery rule to apply 
the Court must find that the Deputies did not become aware of key facts because of the 
Sheriff s concealment or misleading conduct occurring before the limitation period ran. The 
Deputies do not allege that any concealment or misleading conduct prevented them from 
becoming aware of who was promoted or whether they held the minimum qualifications for 
the job. 
Defendant's allege that they were not given access to eligibility or promotional 
registers. A review of promotional registers or eligibility lists is not relevant. There is no 
evidence that the Deputies pursued the procedures and remedies available under GRAMA 
to obtain copies of promotion or eligibility registers or that they even requested registers. 
The Deputies had access to job descriptions, the JPPM, and the OPMRR, and could have 
ascertained with reasonable diligence job minimum qualifications and whether the promoted 
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sergeants met those qualifications. 
The Deputies claim their inaction to be a result of assurances of department 
management that they would be "treated fairly" and "things made right". The Deputies 
cannot reasonably rely on the alleged assurances of Department management, (see argument 
of Mr. Alexanderson at R 1476 22 alleging assurances made in Shift Supervisor meetings 
in 1991) made before the 1991 promotions. Sheriff Bateman had the final say in 
recommending who would be promoted. Nor are any such statements identified as occurring 
within the limitations period. Mr. Alexanderson argued at the April 1997 Pre-hearing and 
later testified that Sheriff Bateman told him to bide his time and things would be made right 
in the two previous years. This alleged statement did not occur within any limitations period 
and cannot form the basis for a finding of fraudulent concealment, or misleading conduct. 
The alleged repeated assurances that they would be treated fairly as a result of the 
reclassification and that the Sheriff personally assured them he would make things right 
concerned complaints the Deputies were already making and aware of. The allegations of 
being treated fairly and make things right are also vague. Were these allegations made in 
the context of promotions of the Deputies to Sergeant or the procedures of future 
promotions? While the Deputies make vague allegations of repeated assurances of being 
treated fairly and that the Sheriff would make things right, the evidence cannot place any 
such assurances within a limitation period following a sergeant promotion. After the 
Deputies were not promoted in 1991 the record contains only three communications between 
the Deputies and anyone in Department Management. The first was April 22, 1992 when 
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the Sheriff responded to Mr. Martin's letter of the same date. Therein (Exhibit 3) the Sheriff 
told Mr. Martin he was not convinced that Mr. Martin's perceptions were accurate. There 
were no promises of promotions, that things would be made right, or favorable treatment in 
the correspondence. Exhibit 3 is a complete denial of Mr. Martin's April 22, 1992 letter. 
The next conversation is detailed by Mr. Alexanderson. Around the 1995 sergeants 
promotions he had a conversation with the Sheriff wherein the Sheriff expressed that he did 
not agree with Mr. Alexanderson's representation that he was having to retest to regain 
ground he already held. The Sheriff said he understood his position but did not agree with 
it and advised "Bide your time and when an opportunity becomes available to test in another 
area of the Department you'll be allowed to test." This was no promise of promotion or that 
things would be made right. The third conversation occurred on December 17, 1996. The 
Sheriff indicated he would investigate the Deputies claims and if he believed they were 
meritorious he would do what he could to make it right. However this conversation 
occurred far too long after 1991 or any promotion to have any effect on a limitation of 
actions. The Deputies' claims of relying on repeated assurances of favorable treatment are 
not reasonable in light of the foregoing conversations. In fact to do so would violate merit 
principles by not considering all qualified applicants for a promotion. UCA 17-33-
5(3)(b)(xi) None of the conversations or alleged repeated false assurances can be 
established to have occurred within any specific limitation period, nor had the effect of 
concealing key facts or misleading the Deputies. 
The Deputies claimed "institutional pressure" to resolve issues internally or their 
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determination that they were unlikely to find promotional success if they were perceived 
unwilling to work within the system does not amount to concealing or misleading conduct 
preventing them from discovering key facts. Nor does urging the Deputies to apply for 
promotions. Nor does a promise to treat them fairly or a promise of promotion. Nor does 
the alleged fluctuation of promotion and eligibility requirements. 
Reliance on concealment of promotion irregularities is unjustified. The Defendant's 
participated in and were familiar with promotion processes or whether a promotional process 
occurred and knew who was promoted. 
The Deputies allegations are further directly controverted by Sheriff Bateman's 
statements (R 1477 at 26), where he says that he never said that he would automatically 
promote the Deputies, but that in December of 1996, he told them if their allegations were 
accurate, he would do what he could to make it right. Captain Quarnberg, said he was never 
approached by the Deputies about why they were not sergeants. (R 1476 132). Also 
showing any reliance on alleged representations to be unreasonable is the conversation Mr. 
Alexanderson had with the Sheriff in 1995.(R 1477 78, 79, supra p24, 25) Besides 
occurring long after and outside of any limitations period, the Sheriffs statements are not 
a promise to promote, to make things right or an attempt to keep the Deputies from filing 
their grievance. 
The record does not contain facts sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of 
fraudulent concealment or misleading conduct which prevented the Deputies from being 
aware of key facts. There is nothing in the record to show that the County concealed facts 
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or engaged in misleading conduct to prevent the Plaintiffs from discovering key facts or 
sleep on their rights. The Deputies' failure to investigate is the only reason for any claimed 
failure to discover. 
No statements were made within limitations periods upon which the Deputies relied 
in not timely bringing this matter before the Council. Even if such statements were made, 
reliance thereon was not reasonable in light of Sheriff Bateman's April 22,1992 letter to Mr. 
Martin and his conversation with Mr. Alexanderson concerning the 1995 promotions. 
VI THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES PRONG OF THE DISCOVERY 
RULE IS NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS. 
A prerequisite to the application of the discovery rule is ignorance by the plaintiff of 
the facts giving rise to the cause of action. To invoke the exceptional circumstances 
version of the discovery rule, the claimants must make a threshold showing that they 
did not know and could not reasonably have known of the existence of a cause of 
action. In fact, the requirement would seem a definitional prerequisite to reliance on 
any version of the discovery rule judicial or legislative. 
O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139, 1144 (Utah 1991). If the Court 
determines the Deputies did not know and could not reasonably have known of the existence 
of facts giving rise to a cause of action, the exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery 
rule does not apply for the following reasons. 
The exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery rule is applicable 
. . . in situations where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the 
application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any 
showing that the Defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action." 
Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds. Inc.. 920 P.2d 575, 578 (Utah App. 1996) 
The ultimate determination of whether a case presents exceptional 
circumstances that render the application of a statute of limitations irrational 
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or unjust is a balancing test...The balancing test weighs the hardship imposed 
on the claimant by the application of the statute of limitations against any 
prejudice to the defendant resulting from the passage of time....Some factors 
this court considers in applying this test include whether the defendant's 
problems caused by the passage of time are greater than the plaintiffs, 
whether the defendant performed a technical service that the plaintiff cannot 
reasonably have been expected to evaluate, and whether the claim has aged to 
the point that witnesses cannot be located, evidence cannot be found, and the 
parties cannot remember basic events. 
Sevev vs. Security Title Company. 902 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995). The alleged hardship 
on the Deputies from applying the limitation of actions would be not promoting the Deputies 
and the extra pay associated with a promotion. This hardship is somewhat minimized by the 
fact that the Deputies did not participate in the 1997 and subsequent sergeant's promotional 
process and Mr. Alexanderson did not test in 1996. The prejudice to Utah County resulting 
from the passage of time is significant however. The Utah County personnel directors 
County from 1991 through 1996 no longer work at the County. One has moved to Arizona, 
the other retired. Documents reflecting job announcements, promotional registers, 
promotional tests and or processes no longer existed or could not be found. The County 
introduced into evidence all documents found relating to Sheriffs Department sergeants' 
promotions. Documents which could have helped reconstruct the prior promotional 
processes and especially the 1991 promotional process could not be found. Further, Sheriff 
Bateman could not recall the 1991 promotional process, and neither could Lieutenant John 
Carlson nor Captain Owen Quarnberg. (R 1476, 145, 146. R 1477 166, 167, 170, 174) 
Utah County did not perform a technical service that the Deputies could not have 
reasonably been expected to evaluate. The exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery 
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rule has applied in only two (2) cases since 1981. In Sevey, Security Title Company failed 
to perfect a security interest in water shares and the water shares were lost. Sevey, at 636. 
The second case, dinger v. Kightlv. 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990) involved a surveyor who had 
negligently surveyed property. The buyers in that case had no reason to suspect that the 
survey was inaccurate. The technical aspects of surveys and perfecting security interests are 
not present in this case. 
Because this case does not involve a technical service and the prejudice to Utah 
County resulting from the passage of time outweighs the alleged hardship imposed on the 
Deputies by the application of the limitation of actions, the exceptional circumstances prong 
does not apply to extend the limitation of actions in this instance. 
VII. NEITHER ESTOPPEL NOR THE DISCOVERY RULE CAN BE RELIED ON 
BY THE DEPUTIES 
The concealment version of the discovery rule is essentially a claim of equitable 
estoppel, whereby a defendant who causes a delay in bringing a cause of action is 
estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a defense to the action. Warren 
v. Provo City Corp., 838 P2d 1125, 1129, 1130 (Utah 1992). 
Under the Court's traditional analysis, to estop a party from claiming the limitation 
of actions as a defense, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's action caused plaintiffs 
failure to bring a timely suit. The elements of estoppel are 
(1) a statement, admission, act or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim 
later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or not taken 
on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or failure to act; (3) injury 
to the plaintiff that would result from allowing the defendant to contradict or 
repudiate such statement, admission, act or failure to act. S & G. Inc. v. 
Intermountain Power Agency 913 P.2d 735, 741, 742 (Utah 1996). 
Any such claim of the discovery rule or estoppel fails because "Utah recognizes the 
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general rule that estoppel may not be asserted against a governmental entity." Weese v. 
Davis County. 834 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah 1992). 
Any claim that Utah County is estopped from asserting the limitation of actions 
defense also fails for the reason that the Deputies cannot point to any statement made within 
the applicable limitations period for the 1991 or subsequent promotional processes upon 
which the Deputies could reasonably rely in not pursuing their claims within any given three 
month limitation period. Even if all arguments and evidence relevant to the limitation of 
actions issue are considered, those arguments are insufficient to establish estoppel or support 
the application of the discovery rule. 
At the Pre Hearing opposing counsel alleged that the Deputies were made promises 
that this would be made good, that it would be made good and handled internally, there were 
repeated complaints to the Sheriff from the Deputies, that the Sheriff said he would make 
good on it in 1996, and that the first time the Sheriff said he would do nothing was in 
December of 1996. Counsel further represented that they were told to bide their time and 
it would be made right, that they were given notice that further testing would be suspended 
until this matter was settled. (R752-754) Argument at the April 23, 1997 hearing alleged 
promises that the Sheriff would make it right, it would be handled internally, and that they 
relied on promises made by Captain Quarnberg and people below the Sheriff that it will be 
made right. (R 1476 14, 16, 17, 30). 
Even assuming for the point of argument that these representations are true, the 
Deputies can point to no statements made in the three months following the 1991 
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promotions or three months following any promotions in which the Deputies were told that 
this matter would "be made right or handled internally". The statements that this would be 
"made good or made right" are vague promises upon which reliance would not be 
reasonable. As Sheriff Bateman made final promotion recommendations, his statements 
only could be reasonably relied on. 
The representation that they were given notice that there would be no further 
sergeant's testing until the matter was settled was in reference to the 1997 sergeant's 
promotions in which the Deputies did not participate. The time frame of these alleged 
statements is limited by other statements. At the Pre Hearing, Counsel alleges the Sheriff 
said he would make good on it in 1996. (R754) At the Pre Hearing Mr. Alexanderson, said 
"Promises were made by the Sheriff numerous times over the last two years." (R751) The 
arguments of the Deputies are simply too vague to place a promise of the Sheriff within a 
specific three month time period after a hiring decision was made. None of the alleged 
promises to make it right or not promote until their issue was settled were not made until 
1995 and 1996, even according to their allegations. This is far too long after the 1991 
promotional process to have any effect in estopping the County from asserting the limitation 
of actions contained in the PRR. Any reliance thereon would be unreasonable in light of the 
time period which passed between the promotional processes and the filing of the grievance 
in 1997 and also in light of the Sheriff Bateman's response to Mr. Martin's 1992 letter. 
(Exhibits 2, 3). 
The Deputies' allegations are further directly controverted by Sheriff Bateman's 
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statements (R 1476, 26) where he says that he never said that he would automatically 
promote the Deputies, but that in December of 1996, he told them if their allegations were 
accurate, he would do what he could to make it right. Captain Quarnberg, said he was never 
approached by the Deputies about why they were not sergeants. (R 1476, 132). Also, 
showing reliance on any alleged representations to be unreasonable is the conversation Mr. 
Alexanderson had with the Sheriff in early 1995 (R 1476 78, 79), where the Sheriff said he 
understood Mr. Alexanderson's position, but didn't necessarily agree with it. There was no 
promise to promote or make things right. In fact to just promote the Deputies would violate 
merit principles by not considering all qualified applicants. 
CONCLUSION 
It was clearly erroneous for the CSC to find that the trigger date for purposes of the 
CSC three month limitation of actions was the Deputies' December, 1996 conversation with 
Sheriff Bateman. Based on their own statements, the Deputies knew or should have known 
of their cause of action in December of 1991 when they learned they were not promoted. 
There is no evidence to support a finding that Utah County participated in concealment or 
misleading conduct preventing the Deputies from discovering key facts— that they were not 
promoted and that someone else not meeting minimum qualifications was. The Deputies 
cannot satisfy the threshold showing that they neither knew or should have known of their 
grievance in December, 1996, or a primae facie showing of concealment or misleading 
conduct preventing the Deputies from discovering key facts during the limitation period. 
There are no circumstances in this case that warrant the application of the exceptional 
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circumstances of the discovery rule. Estoppel is not available against Utah County and no 
inconsistent statements were made within or outside of limitation periods upon which the 
deputies reasonably relied in not filing the grievance within the three month limitation. 
Based on the forgoing, the Court should therefor reverse the CSC and uphold the 
decision of the District Court dismissing this action for the Deputes failure to timely file 
their grievance within three months of its occurrence. In the alternative should the Court 
find the grievance was timely filed, this matter should be remanded to the District Court to 
consider Utah County's other significant arguments not presently before this Court.3 
Respectfully submitted this 22 day of November, 2002. 
M. CORT GRIFFIN 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
Attorney for Appellee Utah County 
3
 The District Court Order (which the Deputies did not object to) referenced only 
the failure of the Deputies to timely file. Utah County was not required to appeal dicta 
contained in the District Court Memorandum Decision. Other significant issues raised 
below and unaddressed in the Memorandum Decision include whether the JPPM can 
form the basis of an implied contract with a statutory employee, whether the disclaimer in 
the JPPM prevents the Deputies from relying on the JPPM to form an implied contract, 
whether the JPPM overrides Personnel job descriptions containing minimum 
qualifications, or the effect of the elimination of the shift supervisor position and the 
revision of job descriptions on minimum qualifications contained in outdated policies in 
the JPPM to name a few. 
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lack of support for any political party, committee, 
organization, agency, or person engaged in a 
political activity. 
5. No officer or employee may engage in any political 
activity during the hours of employment nor shall 
any person solicit political contributions from 
County employees during hours of employment for 
political purposes, but nothing in this section 
shall preclude voluntary contribution by a County 
employee to the party or candidate of the 
employee's choice. 
6. Nothing contained in this section shall be 
construed to permit partisan political activity of 
any County employee who is prevented or restricted 
from engaging in such political activity by the 
provision of the Federal Hatch Act. 
E. Appeal Procedure. 
1. Any Career Service employee who has completed a 
Schedule B probationary period or a promotional 
trial period having a grievance over merit 
principles may appeal to the Career Service 
Council. The employee must file a written notice 
with the Personnel Director within three (3) months 
from the date of the occurrence. Procedures 
outlined by the Career Service Council will then be 
followed. Exception: Career service employees 
appealing discharge must do so within 10 working 
days as outlined in this section (F.8.). 
2. The section regarding Constructive Discipline and 
Appeal Procedure applies only to Career service 
employees who have completed their probationary 
period. However, employees who are in a 
promotional trial period cannot appeal a 
reassignment to their former grade and step. 
F. Constructive Discipline and Appeal Procedure. 
1. The primary purpose of disciplinary action is to 
change negative employee behavior. When discipline 
can be handled in a positive manner, an employee is 
less likely to feel hostile or defensive and far 
more likely to make a serious commitment to change 
behavior. The "constructive" approach to employee 
discipline is fair and supportive, treats the 
employee as a responsible adult, and allows him/her 
to maintain self respect through the process. 
2. Over the years, a set of generally accepted 
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